Republican Judicial Appointments: The Fracture and Restructure of Federalism

Edited by Sudipta Rout

Abstract

Can Republican presidents dictate the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence through judicial appointments? Since the founding of the United States, federalism has remained a central tension between national authority and state sovereignty, reflected in foundational texts such as the Federalist Papers. Republican presidents have consistently sought to restore power to the states through their judicial nominations, but the realities of the confirmation process and the independence of Supreme Court justices impose significant limits on presidential control. This article examines the extent to which Republican presidents from 1969 to 2005 succeeded in reshaping the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Drawing on archival materials from the Library of Congress and existing scholarship on judicial behavior and constitutional change, this article argues that the federalism revival of the Rehnquist Court was inherently unstable. The evidence demonstrates that these efforts were only partially successful: the Court’s strategic and selective deployment of federalism doctrine did not merely constrain the project but ultimately contributed to its fragmentation and collapse.