Edited by Zara Jamshed, Nyssa Galatas
Abstract
The 2021 military withdrawal from Afghanistan marked one of the most chaotic and tragic episodes in recent U.S. foreign policy, culminating in the deaths of 13 U.S. service members at Abbey Gate. This paper examines the executive branch’s systemic failure during the withdrawal, focusing on the legal responsibilities and institutional breakdowns within the Department of State and the National Security Council. Through an analysis of statutory obligations under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 and executive conduct surrounding the Doha Agreement, the paper argues that the failure to uphold non-combatant evacuation protocols and ensure interagency coordination directly contributed to the crisis. Additionally, the executive branch’s resistance to congressional oversight highlights a broader erosion of accountability in foreign policy and military engagement matters. The study concludes with recommendations for legislative reform to clarify agency duties, enforce compliance, and restore a functional balance between the executive and legislative branches during national security crises.
